# 1NC

### Off

#### "Financial incentives for energy production" involve the exchange of money for production.

Book 11 [Managing Director, ClearView Energy Partners, LLC]

Kevin, Testimony before U.S. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,

SUBCOMMITTEES ON SELECT REVENUE MEASURES AND OVERSIGHT, SEPTEMBER 22, http://waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Booktestimony922.pdf

Incentive cost ratios, implied abatement costs and implied displacement costs offer three possible ways to measure the performance of **federal financial incentives for energy production** and consumption. Metrics of this sort could be used to prioritize spending – dynamically, perhaps through a reverse auction – or through legislated formulas **that balance incentives for high-yield, low-cost sources with high-potential, emerging sources.** Fuels or technologies that consistently fall short of established benchmarks may require a different type of government financial intervention (e**.g. manufacturing assistance or pre-competitive R&D** in place of production **tax credits**) or a different mode of financial support (e.g. loan guaranteesinstead of tax credits **or deductions)**.

#### For is a term of exclusion – requiring direct action upon

US CUSTOMS COURT 39 AMERICAN COLORTYPE CO. v. UNITED STATES C. D. 107, Protest 912094-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of New York UNITED STATES CUSTOMS COURT, THIRD DIVISION 2 Cust. Ct. 132; 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 35

The same reasons used by the appellate court may be adopted in construing the language of the statute herein involved. If the words "for industrial use" mean no more than the words "articles of utility," there could be no reason for inserting the additional words "for industrial use" in the paragraph. Therefore, it must be held that the [\*135] new language "for industrial use" was intended to have a different meaning from the words "articles of utility," as construed in the case of Progressive Fine Arts Co. v. United States, [\*\*8] supra. Webster's New International Dictionary defines the word "industrial" as follows: Industrial. 1. Relating to industry or labor as an economic factor, or to a branch or the branches of industry; of the nature of, or constituting, an industry or industries \* \* \* . The transferring of the scenes on an oil painting to a printed copy is a branch of industry under the definition above quoted. Some of the meanings of the preposition "for" signify intent, as shown by the following definition in the same dictionary: For. 2. Indicating the end with reference to which anything is, acts, serves, or is done; as: a. As a preparation for; with the object of; in order to be, become, or act as; conducive to. \* \* \*. d. Intending, or in order, to go to or in the direction of. Therefore, the words "articles for industrial use" in paragraph 1807 imply that Congress intended to exclude from that provision articles either purchased or imported with the intention to use the same in industry for manufacturing purposes.

#### Vote Negative

#### Limits- there are infinite financial incentives that can be tied to things external to energy production- limiting the incentives part of the topic to directly involving production is key to limits because of the difficulty of defining what a restriction on energy production is

#### Our limit is the only non- arbitrary one because it is the most grammatically correct- financial incentives for energy production is an adjectival phrase- even if their aff is a financial incentive- it is not DIRECTLY for energy production

### Off

#### The affirmative props up the distinction between licit and illicit nuclear markets that is used to erase difference

Hecht 2010 [Gabrielle is associate professor of history at the University of Michigan, January Technology and Culture¶ Volume 51, Number 1, Project Muse]

The distinction between licit and illicit market activities depended on one's place in the geography of nuclear things. From the late 1970s onward, Namibian yellowcake played a central role in the (cold war, capitalist) uranium market. Its presence and its price helped keep conversion and enrichment plants in business; it fueled power reactors as well as bombs. When the liberation struggles in southern Africa threatened to render its uranium illicit, producers recruited these allies and their technopolitical mechanisms in an increasingly desperate (and ultimately successful) effort to remain in business. In this instance provenance, rather than nuclearity or markets, became reconfigured. The technopolitics of provenance not only served to materially intertwine licit trade and black markets; they also enacted a profound symbolic erasure of African things from Western nuclear systems.

#### Exceptionalism leads to extinction- produces a denial of death that demands constant causalities

Peterson ‘7 (Christopher, Lecturer @ University of Western Sidney, Kindred Specters: Death, Mourning, and American Affinity, pgs. 3-8)

While this study accords with the claim that American culture disavows mortality, 1 do not argue for any simple reversal of this interdiction with an aim toward affirming finitude per se. If death is beyond our experience (as Heidegger among others has observed), if I am ultimately absent from "my" own death, then strictly speaking there is nothing for me to recognize or avow. Yet dying is something that I do every day. Indeed, it might be more accurate to say that American culture disavows dying, understood as a process that extends from our birth to our biological demise." Even with such an amended formulation, however, it is not entirely clear whether dying can ever be fully affirmed or avowed. That "we live as if we were not going to die," as Zygmunt Bauman observes, "is a remarkable achievement," especially given the ease with which we disavow dying on a daily basis." Some degree of disavowal would seem both unavoidable and necessary for our survival. Any effort to prolong one's life, from simply eating well and exercising to taking medications to prevent or treat illness, evidences this disavowal. For Bauman, however, the disavowal of dying often has violent political and social consequences. Noting the wartime imperative "to limit our casualties" for instance, Bauman remarks that "the price of that limiting is multiplying the dead on the other side of the battleline" (34). Drawing from Freud's claim that, "at bottom no one believes in his own death," Bauman argues that death is "socially managed" by securing the "immortality" of the few through the mortalization of others (35, his emphasis).8 The belief in my self-presence, which is also always a belief in my immortality, is thus dialectically conditioned by the nonpresence of others. Scholars in race and sexuality studies have done much to bring our attention to the ways in which American culture represents racial and sexual minorities as dead - both figuratively and literally. Indeed, this gesture both accompanies and reinforces the larger cultural dissimulation of mortality by making racial and sexual others stand in for the death that haunts every life. The history of American slavery tells a familiar story of how American consciousness disavows and projects mortality onto its "others." Orlando Patterson has described the institution of slavery in terms of a process of kinship delegitimation that constructs slaves as "socially dead."? For Patterson, slavery - across its various historical forms - emerges as a substitute for death a forced bargain by which the slave retains his/her life only to enter into the liminal existence of the socially dead. As a substitution for death slavery does not "absolve or erase the prospect of death," for the specter of material death looms over the slave's existence as an irreducible remainder (5). This primary stage in the construction of the socially dead person is followed by what Patterson refers to as the slave's "natal alienation," his/her alienation from all rights or claims of birth: in short, a severing of all genealogical ties and claims both to the slave's living blood relatives, and to his/her remote ancestors and future descendants. Although Patterson does not approach the problem of social death through a psychoanalytic vocabulary of disavowal and projection, one might say that the presumptive ontology of slave-owning, legally recognized kinship, was dependent on a deontologization of slave kinship that worked to deny the death that each life bears within itself. Building on Patterson's argument, Toni Morrison observes in Playing in the Dark that, "for a people who made much of their 'newness' - their potential, freedom, and innocence - it is striking how dour, how troubled, how frightened and haunted our early and founding literature truly is." For Morrison, African-American slaves came to shoulder the burden of the darkness (both moral and racial) against which America defined itself. The shadow of a racialized blackness did not so much threaten the ostensible "newness" of American life as it conditioned the latter's appearance as new and free. Hence "freedom," she writes, "has no meaning ... without the specter of enslavement" (56). Echoing Morrison, Russ Castronovo asserts in Necro Citizenship that nineteenth-century American politics constructed the citizen in relation to a morbid fascination with ghosts, seances, spirit rappings, and mesmerism. Taking his point of departure from Patrick Henry's in-famous assertion, "give me liberty or give me death," Castronovo explores how admission into the domain of citizenship required a certain depoliticization and pacification of the subject: "The afterlife emancipates souls from passionate debates, everyday engagements, and earthly affairs that animate the political field."!' From Lincoln's rumored dabbling in spiritualism, to attempts by mediums to contact the departed souls of famous Americans, to a senator's introduction of a petition in 1854 asking Congress to investigate communications with the "other side" so numerous are Castronovo's examples of what he calls" spectral politics" that we would have a difficult time contesting his diagnosis that nineteenth-century American political discourse worked to produce politically and historically dead citizens. That these citizens were constructed in tandem with the production of large slave populations- noncitizens who were urged by slavery proponents and abolitionists alike to believe that emancipation existed in a promised afterlife - would lend still more credence to the argument that nineteenth-century America propagated a dematerialized politics. One wonders, however, how Castronovo's argument sits in relation to Aries's contention that American life tends toward an interdiction of death, and if Castronovo's rejection of necropolitics, moreover, is not finally symptomatic of this very disavowal. Castronovo maintains that, "for cultures that fear death ... necrophilia promotes fascination with and helps tame an unknowable terror:' (5). American necrophilia, according to Castronovo, responds to an overwhelming fear and denial of death. Castronovo thus aims 'to turn us away from such preoccupation with ghosts, spirits, and the afterlife toward "specific forms of corporeality," such as the laboring body, the slave body, and the mesmerized body, in order to avoid "reinscrib[ing] patterns of abstraction" (17). Yet, this move away from general to specific forms of embodiment still retains the notion of "the body," and therefore of a self-contained, sell-present entity. If nineteenth-century politics required that the citizen be disembodied and dematerialized, it does not follow that a move toward embodiment remedies such a spiritualized politics. Although Castronovo cautions that recourse to the body" does not automatically guarantee resistance," the overall tenor of his project pathologizes the spectral (18). Indeed, one has the sense that Castronovo would like to untether politics from death altogether - as if political life is not always haunted by finitude. Reversing the terms of political necrophilia, he offers something like a political necrophobia that sees every intrusion of the spectral as synonymous with depoliticization. If nineteenth-century spiritualism infused American political life with a familiar set of distinctions between spirit/matter, soul/body, that says nothing about how these binaries might be displaced rather than merely reversed. A binaristic approach to the subject of mortality is also legible in Sharon Holland's Raising the Dead, which asserts that "bringing back the dead (or saving the living from the shadow of death) is the ultimate queer act."11Drawing from the activist slogan "silence = death" from the early years of the AIDS epidemic, and extending this activist imperative to address the social death of sexual and racial minorities more generally, Holland observes that the deaths of queer and racial subjects serve "to ward off a nation's collective dread of the inevitable" (38). Yet, as in Castronovo's critique of necropolitics, this imperative to "raise the dead" reverses rather than displaces the logic through which dominant, white, heterosexual culture disavows and projects mortality onto racial and sexual minorities. While we must address the particular effects that social death has on racial and sexual minorities, this social reality must also be thought in relation to a more generalizable principle of mourning. For the "shadow of death" haunts all lives, not just queer ones. The "ultimate queer act," pace Holland, would be to deconstruct rather than reinscribe the binary between life and death, to resist the racist and heterosexist disavowal of finitude. That Americanist literary criticism on the subject of mortality remains implicated in the larger cultural disavowal of dying suggests that we ought to reassess our critical energies, particularly as these powers are enlisted to address how American political ideology produces the "death" of racial and sexual others. Indeed, I would argue that such criticism remains invested - despite all claims to the contrary - in an American exceptionalist project. American exceptionalism names, in part, a fetishization of novelty and futurity that initially defined America against an ostensibly decaying and moribund Europe. As David Noble has argued, the doctrine of exceptionalism excluded America from "the human experience of birth, death, and rebirth" by figuring Europe in terms of time and America in terms of timeless space." If, as George Berkeley put it, America is "time's noblest offspring," history gives birth to its final progeny in order that the latter might escape time altogether. America thus becomes eternally present while "Europe breeds in her decay." If the "new world" qua new must deny mortality, then reanimating the excluded from within the terms of a dialectical reversal renews rather than dismantles the American exceptionalist project. Challenging the ideology of American exceptionalism is particularly crucial for a post-9/11 politics that aims to resist the transformation of American exposure to injury and death into a newly reconsolidated sense of innocence and immortality. As Donald Pease has argued, 9/11 transformed "virgin land" into "ground zero," effecting an ideological shift from a "secured innocent nation to a wounded, insecure emergency state."16 Drawing from the work of Giorgio Agamben. Pease describes the emergency state as a nation that - by exempting itself from its own democratic rules of free speech, due process, and above all, the rules of war - marks a division between those whom the state protects from injury and those whom the state is free to injure and kill with impunity (13). The reduction of the Arab other to that which cannot be killed because it is already dead works to cover over the wound that ground zero opens up under the surface of virgin land. The emergency state (or what Agamben calls the "state of exception") thus also names a nation that attempts to except itself from the universal condition of mortality. As Bauman notes, "if mortality and transience are the norm among humans, durability may be attained only as an exception" (67, his emphasis).

#### The alternative is to reject the Affirmative- Questioning American exceptionalism is key to understanding our place in the world- rejection is key to more productive politics

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Most statements of "American exceptionalism" presume that America's values, political system, and history are unique and worthy of universal admiration. They also imply that the United States is both destined and entitled to play a distinct and positive role on the world stage.¶ The only thing wrong with this self-congratulatory portrait of America's global role is that it is mostly a myth. Although the United States possesses certain unique qualities -- from high levels of religiosity to a political culture that privileges individual freedom -- the conduct of U.S. foreign policy has been determined primarily by its relative power and by the inherently competitive nature of international politics. By focusing on their supposedly exceptional qualities, Americans blind themselves to the ways that they are a lot like everyone else.¶ This unchallenged faith in American exceptionalism makes it harder for Americans to understand why others are less enthusiastic about U.S. dominance, often alarmed by U.S. policies, and frequently irritated by what they see as U.S. hypocrisy, whether the subject is possession of nuclear weapons, conformity with international law, or America's tendency to condemn the conduct of others while ignoring its own failings. Ironically, U.S. foreign policy would probably be more effective if Americans were less convinced of their own unique virtues and less eager to proclaim them.¶ What we need, in short, is a more realistic and critical assessment of America's true character and contributions. In that spirit, I offer here the Top 5 Myths about American Exceptionalism.

### Off

#### Fiscal cliff deal now- insiders agree- PC is key to maintain compromise- failure collapses the economy

Hall and Lightman 11-8 [Kevin G. Hall and David Lightman 11-8-2012 Kansas City Star “Put up or shut up time for Congress, Obama on fiscal cliff” http://www.kansascity.com/2012/11/08/3907178/put-up-or-shut-up-time-for-congress.html]

Lawmakers sent mixed signals this week about serious negotiations vs. driving briefly off the cliff’s edge before settling.¶ Tuesday’s election results kept the same power players in place, the same group that went to that edge repeatedly during budget and debt ceiling negotiations over the last two years.¶ House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, said Wednesday that he was ready to “find the common ground that has eluded us” and talk to Democrats, even about raising revenue.¶ Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., also talked conciliation, promising not to draw “any lines in the sand.”¶ The election’s status quo result – the same president, Republicans still controlling the House of Representatives and Democrats remaining in charge of the Senate – suggests the public “is obviously saying work together, meet halfway, come together,” said Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., usually a fierce partisan.¶ The rank and file may feel less sanguine. The election solidified conservatives’ hold on the House and liberals’ strength in the Senate, suggesting any deal could have a difficult time winning approval.¶ The key, said Republicans, is for President Barack Obama to take the lead and offer a detailed plan.¶ “The only thing that’s changed since the election is that the president is not campaigning,” said Don Stewart, spokesman for Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky.¶ Ultimately, say insiders, the doomsday alternative to inaction will force a deal. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said in a report Thursday that failing to act on the fiscal-cliff components could shave half a percentage point off of growth in the first half of 2013, raising the jobless rate to 9.1 percent and probably would trigger another recession. The CBO also said that addressing the components of the fiscal cliff results in a 3 or 4 percentage point swing between contraction and growth.

#### Energy spending costs capital

McEntee 2012 [Christine McEntee Executive Director and CEO, American Geophysical Union August 15, 2012 “Science, Politics and Public Opinion” National Journal http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php?comments=expandall~~%23comments-http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php?comments=expandall]

We also know that the biggest obstacles to passage of energy and environmental legislation are disagreements about the extent to which the federal government can and should regulate business, and reluctance to launch new initiatives that will add to the deficit. The science tells us that small initiatives that require only nominal investments can't begin to address the environmental and energy challenges we face; and legislation big enough to achieve significant results will cost more than Congress is willing to spend.

#### These conflicts escalate

Mathew J. Burrows (counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC), PhD in European History from Cambridge University) and Jennifer Harris (a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit) April 2009 “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” http://www.twq.com/09april/docs/09apr\_Burrows.pdf

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions (think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century. For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established groupsinheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises Types of conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources, could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

### Off

#### Text: The fifty states and all relevant United States territories should substantially increase funding for the generation of fusion-based energy in the United States.

#### States solve nuclear

Ben-Moshe 2009 (Sony Ben-Moshe, Jason J. Crowell, Kelley M. Gale, Breton A. Peace, Brett P. Rosenblatt, and Kelly D. Thomason, attorneys in the Project Finance Practice Group in the San Diego office of Latham & Watkins, 2009, “FINANCING THE NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE: THE BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF FEDERAL & STATE GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES AND THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN CALIFORNIA,” Energy Law Journal, Volume 30, Number 2, online)

In addition to federal subsidies, various states have passed legislation to promote the development of new nuclear power plants that supplement the financial incentives provided by the DOE. The most commonly used incentive for nuclear construction in states with rate-regulated utilities are regulations which allow utilities to recover their capital costs and construction work in progress (CWIP) in rate-bases utilized to determine the regulated rates utilities charge to consumers either during construction or once the plant is either put in service or abandoned. The states that do not permit costs to be recovered during construction have a process by which a state commission can annually approve costs on a non-appealable basis for inclusion in the rate-base at commercial operation or abandonment.¶ Both rate-regulated and restructured states also provide tax credits or exemptions for new nuclear construction. Kansas exempts new nuclear facilities from state property taxes while Texas permits school districts to enter into agreements with developers of new nuclear plants to limit the appraised value of the plants for purposes of assessing school district maintenance and operations property taxes.¶ The following Table provides a summary of the key features of the various state programs providing financial incentives for new nuclear power development.¶ Legislation is also currently pending in Indiana and Oklahoma that would provide cost recovery mechanisms for new nuclear construction.156 Other states have recently implemented legislation or regulations indicating their support for construction of nuclear power plants through programs aside from direct financial incentives. Utah passed a bill establishing a state position of ―energy officer‖ and a policy to promote ―the study of nuclear power generation.‖157 Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota and Wisconsin all currently have legislation pending to overturn state moratoria on the construction of new nuclear plants.158¶ Finally, Georgia and Kentucky have issued general resolutions to support development of new nuclear power plants, while many other state or local governments have issued resolutions to support the construction of particular nuclear plants. The many states that have recently implemented financial incentives for construction of new nuclear power plants to supplement federal programs, and the states that have released policies in support of nuclear development signify the increasing and widespread support for new nuclear power.

### Leadership

#### Liberal international order high, resilient, and increasing.

**Arntzenius, 2011**

Linda Arntzenius, All Princeton, “Liberal Leviathan: The Case for Cooperation” April 14, http://allprinceton.com/content/liberal-leviathan-case-cooperation

“Obama gets it,” says Ikenberry, who commends the president for reframing the relationship of the United States with the rest of the world. America must pursue a more enlightened strategy than that of recent years in which, it could be argued, the American-led order has gone astray with the Bush administration’s war on terror and the invasion of Iraq. Asked about the role of the U.S. in supporting corrupt governments, and the debacle of Vietnam, Ikenberry admitted that he has long-struggled with the good side/dark side of U.S. history and the dilemma of intervention. His message, however, is that if we are mindful and engaged, keep the system open, make sure our institutions are honest and secure, and are actively involved in the rising structure, we can influence that structure. Interdependence will save us, the message seems to be. We must cooperate more fully and with deep commitment since the incentives to do so are overwhelming. Remember that Hobbesian nightmare. In Liberal Leviathan, Ikenberry sets out his case that the liberal international order is still a force to be reckoned with. Furthermore, he suggests that the rise of non-Western states such as China and the deepening of economic and security interdependence are the result of the successful functioning and expansion of the postwar liberal order rather than a sign of its demise. The liberal international order has evolved in the face of past crises and will do so again. Let’s hope he’s right.

#### Science leadership high now- its an insufficient basis for leadership

David **Dickson** Director, SciDev.Net 4 June **2009** The limits of science diplomacy http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html

Recently, the Obama administration has given this field a new push, in its desire to pursue "soft diplomacy" in regions such as the Middle East. Scientific agreements have been at the forefront of the administration's activities in countries such as Iraq and Pakistan. But — as emerged from a meeting entitled New Frontiers in Science Diplomacy, held in London this week (1–2 June) — using science for diplomatic purposes is not as straightforward as it seems. Some scientific collaboration clearly demonstrates what countries can achieve by working together. For example, a new synchrotron under construction in Jordan is rapidly becoming a symbol of the potential for teamwork in the Middle East. But whether scientific cooperation can become a precursor for political collaboration is less evident. For example, despite hopes that the Middle East synchrotron would help bring peace to the region, several countries have been reluctant to support it until the Palestine problem is resolved. Indeed, one speaker at the London meeting (organised by the UK's Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science) even suggested that the changes scientific innovations bring inevitably lead to turbulence and upheaval. In such a context, viewing science as a driver for peace may be wishful thinking.

#### Science diplomacy fails to create effective solutions- pushing US solutions means there is no chance of solvency

David **Dickson** Director, SciDev.Net 4 June **2009** The limits of science diplomacy http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html

Perhaps the most contentious area discussed at the meeting was how science diplomacy can frame developed countries' efforts to help build scientific capacity in the developing world. There is little to quarrel with in collaborative efforts that are put forward with a genuine desire for partnership. Indeed, partnership — whether between individuals, institutions or countries — is the new buzzword in the "science for development" community. But true partnership requires transparent relations between partners who are prepared to meet as equals. And that goes against diplomats' implicit role: to promote and defend their own countries' interests.

#### No energy leadership- everyone knows its impossible

Francois Cellier, 11-10-2009, MS in electrical engineering, PhD degree in technical sciences from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, worked at the University of Arizona as professor in electrical engineering, specialization in modeling and simulation methodologies, specialist in modeling and simulation of physical systems at the Institute of Computational Science, The Oil Drum: Europe, “The Future of Nuclear Energy: Facts and Fiction - Part IV: Energy from Breeder Reactors and from Fusion?,” <http://www.iseof.org/~europe/node/5929#Ref_31>

The material that surrounds and contains thousands of cubic meters of plasma in a full-scale fusion reactor has to satisfy two requirements. First, it has to survive an extremely high neutron flux with energies of 14 MeV, and second, it has to do this not for a few minutes but for many years. It has been estimated that in a full-scale fusion power plant the neutron flux will be at least 10-20 times larger than in today's state-of-the-art nuclear fission power plants. Since the neutron energy is also higher, it has been estimated that -with such a neutron flux- each atom in the solid surrounding the plasma will be displaced 475 times over a period of 5 years [36]. Second, to further complicate matters, the material in the so called first wall (FW) around the plasma will need to be very thin in order to minimize inelastic neutron collisions resulting in the loss of neutrons (for more details see next section), yet at the same time thick enough so that it can resist both the normal and the accidental collisions from the 100-million-degree hot plasma for years. The "erosion" from the neutron bombardment has been estimated to be about 3 mm per "burn" year for carbon-like materials, and it has been estimated to be about 0.1 mm per burn year even for materials like tungsten [36]. In short, no material known today can even come close to meeting the requirements described above. Exactly how a material that meets these requirements could be designed and tested remains a mystery, because tests with such extreme neutron fluxes cannot be performed either at ITER or at any other existing or planned facility.

### STEM

#### We have tested nuclear weapons

Millson 2011 (Christopher Millson graduated in 2011 with a concentration in History from Colorado State University in Fort Collins, CO, Student Pulse, 2011, “Nuclear Weapons Testing in the United States: Sacrificing Health for National Defense,” VOL. 3 NO. 06)

The first successful nuclear weapons test took place in New Mexico, but following WWII America moved its test sites to the Pacific. For nearly a decade the United States continued to conduct tests on the islands of Palau, Mururoa, and the New Hebrides. But after only five tests the government began to test the majority of its weapons in Nevada. Testing in the Pacific was expensive, and the government was experiencing problems from the inhabitants. Many sights were considered, but the climate, geology, security, and access made the Nevada Test Site the final location for testing. Although the government had a new location, the Pacific Test Site was still used for testing, specifically intercontinental missile testing.

#### Nuclear stockpile will inevitably be stable—future research creates security dilemma and miscalculation—net worse for stability

**Elkind ’12** (David J. is a research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues “American Nuclear Primacy: the End of MAD or a New START?” May 22 http://csis.org/blog/american-nuclear-primacy-end-mad-or-new-start

These results show that the United States cannot reasonably claim to have obtained nuclear primacy. Reductions in the two nations’ respective arsenals, coupled with the large number of Russian targets collaborate to make it exceptionally difficult to destroy the Russian arsenal in a counterforce first strike. Even though my results demonstrate a modest level of confidence in the baseline scenario, I believe that mutually assured destruction remains in place. Because the costs of even a single Russian warhead surviving would have such devastating consequences for the United States, I do not believe that any President or military planner would care to wager America’s most populous cities in conducting a nuclear first strike. While these results speak to the purely military considerations of that choice, the political, ethical and humanitarian considerations likewise make such an action highly unlikely. Even though this article concludes that the US could not carry out a counterforce strike on the Russian arsenal in 2012, and therefore does not possess nuclear primacy, this should not be interpreted as a call to restart the arms race or otherwise acquire primacy. Liber and Press write that “the shift in the nuclear balance could significantly damage relations among the great powers and increase the probability of nuclear war,” and outline a variety of possible mechanisms by which this could come to pass and present rebuttals to counterarguments (interested readers should refer to Lieber and Press, “The End of MAD?” 31-38). To bridge the gap in nuclear capabilities, Russia and China may undertake perilous activities to restore the nuclear balance, such as pre-delegated launch authority, a launch-on-warning posture, or larger nuclear arsenals. Pre-delegated launch authority increases the risk of unauthorized nuclear use; Cold War experience confirms that launch-on-warning postures are vulnerable to false alarms initiating a counter-attack to imaginary missiles; arms races carry the risk that one side will perceive that it has gained the upper hand and undertake a nuclear first use. Furthermore, nuclear primacy carries considerable risks in times of crisis. In the event of a political crisis or a conventional war between the US and a rival power, the threat of a disarming strike by the United States may predispose the rival to land the first blow while it still has the means to do so. In this way, having a reduced confidence in the ability of the US to carry out a first strike should be read as a stabilizing feature of international politics, as strategic stability (if it had ever departed) has been restored as a pillar of the international system. External to these considerations, achieving nuclear primacy would be a pyrrhic victory. The preceding analysis assumes that the United States is in possession of perfect intelligence on the locations and attributes of Russian nuclear weapons facilities and is able to carry out such an attack unhindered by air- or missile-defenses (and concludes such an attack is ill-advised despite possessing perfect information). Even if mobile missiles do not continuously patrol, it would make sense for Russia to shuttle them from one garrison to another in order to decrease Russia’s opponents’ confidence in accounting for all of them. Furthermore, Russia’s decision to deploy its mobile forces in the event of a crisis (or continuously as a matter of policy) could spark concerns in Washington that either a Russian attack is immanent or simply that United States’ confidence in a first-strike option has evaporated, creating further perceptions of insecurity and upsetting the strategic environment which, in the mind of US policymakers, has assumed nuclear primacy. What’s more, mobile deployments are a cheap, easy countermeasure that would effectively negate the confidence gained (such as any is gained) from believing that the United States has nuclear primacy. Achieving, and then maintaining, a position of primacy introduces several significant strategic concerns of its own, and would hardly enhance the security of the United States or the international system. I would like to advance this line of argumentation one step further. If this model accurately reflects reality and a Liber and Press-style counterforce strike on Russia’s nuclear arsenal is unlikely to succeed, then deep cuts to the nuclear arsenal and the decision to abandon counterforce targeting gains credibility. That is, deep cuts to the nuclear arsenal would not mean abandoning counterforce doctrine because that has already happened. Simply put, attempting the counterforce attack would include an inescapable risk to the United States – and we can rest easier knowing that this is the case.

#### Conventional Weapons solve deterrent effects

**Gerson ‘9** (CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE RETHINKING U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE MODERATOR: JAMES ACTON, ASSOCIATE, NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT SPEAKERS: MICHAEL S. GERSON, RESEARCH ANALYST, CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

The National Academy of Sciences report on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy advocated “no first use.” Again, along these lines that the major conventional threat had disappeared, therefore we didn’t need to rely on the threat of nuclear weapons to deter – to help to bolster deterrence of a conventional attack. **Moreover, the conventional capability – U.S. conventional superiority demonstrated so well in the first Gulf War** **made it such that conventional capabilities were absolutely sufficient for deterrence**. Even Paul Nitze, one of the architects of NSC- 68 in 1994 asked “is it time to junk our nukes?” His argument was **smart conventional weapons should be the principal U.S. deterrent. They’re safer, they cause less collateral damage, they provide more flexibility, there’s less risk of escalation, and perhaps most importantly, they’re highly credible**. So **people who had once concocted rather elaborate scenarios for nuclear war-fighting came around to this view, that smart conventional weapons would be the principal deterrent**, whereas those in favor of no-first-use advocated one set of use.

#### Nuclear Primacy is bad though

#### Primcay increases likelihood of nuclear war

Charles L. Glaser is Professor and Deputy Dean of the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago, and Steve Fetter is Professor and Dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84–126

Although U.S. damage-limitation capabilities would provide these foreign policy benefits, they would also bring significant risks. Most basic, the ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy interests more assertively could increase the probability that an adversary will use nuclear weapons against it. By promising to reduce U.S. vulnerability, counternuclear threats could make the United States willing to engage in certain conflicts that it would otherwise avoid and to bargain harder in others. Although the balance of resolve would shift toward the United States, there could be cases in which the probability that an adversary will escalate to nuclear attack also increases. This can occur when the shift in the balance of resolve increases uncertainty about which state’s resolve is greater.54 The somewhat counterintuitive result is that while enhanced counternuclear capabilities strengthen the willingness of the United States to pursue its interests, they can also increase the probability that the United States or its allies will suffer a nuclear attack. In cases in which this is not true, U.S. counternuclear capabilities either are insufficient to restore leeway to the United States’ foreign policy or unnecessary because it already enjoys a large advantage in resolve. In addition, there is some danger that the United States will exaggerate the effectiveness of its counternuclear capabilities and, as a result, run an unjustifiably high risk of suffering a nuclear attack. As stressed earlier, for counternuclear attacks to be effective, the United States would require excellent intelligence on the location and operation of the adversary’s nuclear force. U.S. leaders who fail to appreciate uncertainties in U.S. intelligence might launch a nuclear attack that was much less likely to be effective than they believed. It is essential that U.S. leaders be fully informed about the likely effectiveness of U.S. counternuclear capabilities, including not only uncertainty about U.S. weapons systems, but also uncertainty about U.S. intelligence concerning the adversary’s force deployments and operations. Any biases in the U.S. system that exaggerate the overall effectiveness of U.S. damage-limitation capabilities could lead to unwarranted assertiveness and the accompanying risks of nuclear attack

Counterforce leads to accidental launch

Harold Feiveson, ed., The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999).

Counterforce doctrine increases the risk of accidental or erroneous strikes. A policy of targeting opposing nuclear forces for rapid destruction puts pressure on the other side to be ready at all times to launch vulnerable forces (particularly ICBMs and pier-side SLBMs) on short notice before they are destroyed. This hair-trigger posture could lead to a launch of Russian nuclear forces in response to a false warning or a massive U.S. response to a small accidental or unauthorized Russian attack. A doctrine that provides for the rapid launch of nuclear forces during peacetime simply cannot be justified in the post—cold war security environment where the probability of an accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous launch is far greater than the probability of a deliberate nuclear attack. Even an option to launch under attack is unwise because it forces political and military leaders to make momentous decisions in a few minutes with incomplete information on the nature or origin of the attack.

#### It only takes one mishap cause escalation

Scott Sagan (professor of political science and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation) 1993 “The Limits of Safety” p. 101

There was also at least some risk that the accidental detonation of one nuclear weapon might lead, through some mixture of unanticipated events, to further accidents. The Join chiefs specifically addressed the question of rules of engagement for US interceptors during the crisis and ordered that conventional armaments only were to be used against any soviet or Cuban aircraft entering airspace over the southeaster United States in response to a US invasion of Cuba. The JCS reminded NORAD and the ADC on October 28, however, that the usual authority and rules of engagement for all other US interceptor forces were still in effect: “if the pattern of actions elsewhere in the NORAD…system indicated the existence of a Cuban and Sino-Soviet attack, nuclear weapons could be used to destroy hostile aircraft. The following hypothetical scenario is not implausible in this highly complex and tightly coupled system. Imagine an accidental nuclear detonation inside the United States: it could be produced by a SAC bomber crash, mishandling of a weapon at an air force base, or an inadvertent use of an interceptor’s nuclear air-to-air missile. Under such conditions, communications might be impaired by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or other nuclear weapon’s effects, and any lower-level commander in the vicinity of the detonation might see this as unambiguous evidence that a soviet attack was under way. If the deputy for operations in the regional command post held this belief, he could, acting fully within his proper authority, order interceptors to use nuclear weapons against any suspected incoming hostile aircraft. The danger of “ambiguous command” could also become severe under these circumstances: if an airborne interceptor pilot witnessed a nuclear burst in the distance, couldn’t not establish radio contact with base command posts, and believed a hostile aircraft was approaching in range, what would be the appropriate response? The possibility that one accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon could lead to further accident escalation cannot therefore be entirely ruled out.

### Fusion

#### Naval power is ridiculously high now

Bruner 10/27 (Jeffrey Bruner, wire chief for the Gannett National Wire Desk in Des Moines, October 27, 2012, “Fact check: U.S. Navy is the world's most powerful by far,” My Desert, http://www.mydesert.com/article/20121027/NEWS03/310250086/Fact-check-U-S-Navy-world-s-most-powerful-by-far)

Question: Has America’s Navy declined in recent years?¶ Answer: This was a point of contention during the presidential debate about foreign policy. Mitt Romney said that America has the same number of ships that it did in 1917. President Barack Obama responded that those ships have vastly greater capacities than their counterparts of 95 years ago.¶ Compared with the rest of the world, the United States has — by far — the most powerful Navy.¶ America has 11 aircraft carriers. Spain and Italy have two. France, Britain, Russia, India, Brazil, China and Thailand all have one.¶ America has 62 destroyers, compared with 27 for China and 13 for Russia. As far as nuclear-powered attack submarines, America has more (54) than the rest of the world combined.

#### Naval power is not necessary or sufficient

George Friedman (Ph.D., is an internationally recognized expert in security and intelligence issues relating to national security, information warfare and computer security. He is founder, chairman and Chief Intelligence Officer of STRATFOR) 4/10/2007 The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power http://www.petroleumworld.com/SunOPF07041501.htm

That argument is persuasive, but it poses this problem: The Navy provides a powerful option for war initiation by the United States, but it cannot by itself sustain the war. In any sustained conflict, the Army must be brought in to occupy territory -- or, as in Iraq, the Marines must be diverted from the amphibious specialty to serve essentially as Army units. Naval air by itself is a powerful opening move, but greater infusions of airpower are needed for a longer conflict. Naval transport might well be critically important in the opening stages, but commercial transport sustains the operation.

#### ITER solves magnet tech and superconductivity – \*this is 1ac evidence/author

Silverstein 12 (Ken, Editor of Energy Central and Contributor – Forbes, "The Tantalizing Promise And Peril Of Nuclear Fusion", Forbes Magazine, 4-15, http://www.forbes.com/sites/kensilverstein/2012/04/15/nuclears-strongest-potential-weapon-fusion/)

To that end, an international consortium has already spent $20 billion on fusion research and development. The so-called International Nuclear Fusion Project, or ITER, is aiming to have a demonstration reactor erected in France by 2019. All of the member states comprising the European Union, as well as the United States, Russia, Japan, China, India and South Korea participate. They are sharing their resources to pay for the scientific and engineering skills needed to bring such a concept to scale.¶ What immediate benefits do those participants get from funding ITER, or from making their o¶ own national investments in nuclear fusion? Magnet technology is one area, which is used in medical devices such as magnetic resonance imagery that allows doctor’s see completely inside the human brain.¶ That’s what Michael Claessens, head of communications for ITER Organization, explained to this reporter in an email. Superconducting and advanced materials are two additional benefits, he notes, adding that more such bonuses will occur in the future, as it does with any high-level research.¶ ITER’s total construction costs for the demo to go up in France is about 13 billion Euros, or $17 billion through 2020. For each ITER member that represents “about 1 percent of their public research and development spending,” says Claessens. “All ITER members consider this spending a good investment. What is at stake is a new source of energy on earth, which will be safe, with almost limitless fuel and environmentally responsible.”

#### Britain solved your adv

TPCW 6-30-2012 Coming war between Iran and U.S. over the Strait of Hormuz http://www.teapartyculturewar.com/BlogRetrieve.aspx?BlogID=12050&TagID=214229

The Sunburn is versatile and easy to use. It can be fired from practically any platform, including the back of a flatbed truck. It has a 100-mile range, which is all that is necessary in the narrow Persian Gulf. If Iran and the U.S. start a shooting war, Russia and China will watch with tremendous interest. The Iranians will have mapped every firing angle along their Gulf coastline. The rugged terrain will not make detection easy. Some suggest it will be like shooting fish in a barrel. The British have deployed the HMS Daring, a billion destroyer, with the world’s most sophisticated naval radar, and defense weapons which can shoot down sea skimming missiles.

#### Vipers solve – can shot down sea skimming missiles

Stuart Littlewood, British Writer-Photographer 2011 Persian Gulf warmongers get nasty shock http://edition.presstv.ir/iphone/detail.aspx?id=229255

Britain recently announced the deployment of HMS Daring, a new Type 45 destroyer, to the Persian Gulf in order to send a significant message to the Iranians because of the firepower and world-beating technology carried by this warship. A Daily Telegraph report says she has been fitted with new technology that will give it the ability to "shoot down any missile in Iran's armory. The £1 billion destroyer also carries the world's most sophisticated naval radar, capable of tracking multiple incoming threats from missiles to fighter jets." Her 48 Sea Vipers can shoot down fighters as well as sea skimming missiles. Apart from HMS Daring, Britain is believed to have at least 3 other vessels in the Persian Gulf, and more can be sent. Are they all equipped with the same world-beating technology?

#### New US deployments can deter attack; including joint missile defense exercises and defense capable ships.

International Relations and Security Network, 18 October 2012 The 'Third Track': US Military Moves in Persian Gulf <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Security-Watch/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=153582>

Indeed, since January 2012, there has been a greater sense of urgency by the Obama administration tostrengthen elements of the ‘third track’. Despite continued efforts to prevent Israel from pursuing the military option, the United States has also taken significant steps to prevent possible Iranian brinkmanship. These have included threats to close the all-important energy transportation routes of the Straits of Hormuz and threats to retaliate against attacks to American assets and interests in the Middle East region. The threat to retaliate is also extended to attacks made on Washington’s allies.¶ However, Washington’s primary response has been to strengthen its military profile in the Persian Gulf. Since January 2012, the waters in and around Persian Gulf have played host to five US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier strike groups. These have included the USS Carl Vinson, Abraham Lincoln, Enterprise, Eisenhower, and the John Stennis. At least two of these strike groups (Stennis and Eisenhower as of September 2012) have been ‘on-station’ in the Fifth Fleet area of operations (AOR), which is based in Manama, Bahrain. For its part, the Pentagon has insisted that such force deployments were not related to Iran, but were instead ‘prudent force posture requirements set by the combatant commander’.¶ The formidable assets that these two aircraft carrier strike groups bring to the table include more than 100 F-18 Hornet and Super Hornet fighter jets, destroyers, surveillance aircraft, nuclear-powered attack submarines, missile cruisers, logistics ships and other vessels. Reports also note that the United States has deployed unspecified numbers of advanced F-22 Raptors and F-15C fighter jets at Al Udeid and Al Dhafra in Abu Dhabi and Qatar respectively. Mine counter measure (MCM) ships (8 currently), coastal patrol vessels (5 currently, to double by 2013), amphibious troop carrying platforms and innovative assets like underwater robots have also been deployed by the United States near Iranian waters.¶ Apart from the abovementioned force deployments, United States has also carried out a wide-range of military exercises with its allies in the region, including on land (in Jordan) and at sea. Joint US-Israeli missile defense exercises are also slated to be held in October. A third X-band radar site (apart from two such sites in Israel and Turkey) is being built in Qatar and the United States has maintained a BMD-capable ship presence in the waters of the Mediterranean Sea as well since March 2011.

#### Regional regimes solve their offense- ensures no arms race

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Asia is also ready for a decreased U.S. military presence, and Washington should begin gradually withdrawing its troops. Although China has embarked on an ambitious policy of military modernization and engages in periodic saber rattling in the South China Sea, its ability to project power remains limited. Japan and South Korea are already shouldering greater defense burdens than they were during the Cold War. India, the Philippines, and Vietnam are eager to forge strategic partnerships with the United States. Given the shared interest in promoting regional security, these ties could be sustained through bilateral political and economic agreements, instead of the indefinite deployments and open-ended commitments of the Cold War.

#### No alliance cred impact

**Fettweis 2004** (Christopher J. Fettweis, assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, Ph.D. University of Maryland's Department of Government and Politics, University of Notre Dame, August 2010, “The Remnants of Honor: Pathology, Credibility and U.S. Foreign Policy,” conference paper for the 2010 American Political Science Association meeting, online)

Scholars have been struggled to identify cases where high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals during the Cold War. The short-term aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, included neither a string of Soviet reversals nor a display of bandwagoning with the West throughout the Third World.73 In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart “you Americans will never be able to do this to us again.”74 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that “the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power....The 1962 Cuban crises was thus an historic turning point – but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed.”75 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to have learned the wrong lesson.

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### 2NC A2: Energy Production

#### R&D doesn’t directly affect energy production- there are a laundry list of goals they can affect, proves the abuse

EIA 7 (Energy Information Administration, "Federal Energy Research and Development," http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy2/pdf/execsum.pdf)

Research and Development (R&D). Federal R&D spending focuses on a variety of goals, such as increasing U.S. energy supplies, or improving the efficiency of various energy production, transformation, and end-use technologies. **R&D expenditures do not directly affect** current **energy production** and prices, but, if successful, they could affect future production and prices.

#### Nuclear energy production exclusively focuses on electricity

Herrsnz, Linares, and Moratilla 8 (L.E. - Unit of Nuclear Safety Research, J.I. and B.Y - Rafael Marino Chair of New Energy Technologies Comillas Pontifical U, "Power cycle assessment of nuclear high temperature gas-cooled reactors," <http://www.ewp.rpi.edu/hartford/users/papers/engr/ernesto/millav/EP/References/Applied%20Thermal%20Engineering%20%5B6%5D.pdf>)

Nonetheless, at present nuclear **energy production** is almost **exclusively focused on electricity generation**, which accounts for only 16% of the energy consumed worldwide (being nearly 80% of the remaining energy obtained by burning fossil fuels [3]). Therefore, nuclear energy contribution to overcome issues like depletion and supply shortages of fossil fuels and global warming would be vigorously reinforced if a wider energy market was addressed. Industrial heat consumption is a good candidate to accomplish such a diversity of energy products. However, most of the industrial process heat applications require much higher temperatures than the operating temperatures of present light water reactors (LWR). Besides, the amount of energy required is never more than a few hundred MWs, while the present systems become competitive only for a thermal production of a few thousand MWs.

#### Courts have acknowledged a separation of ENERGY PRODUCTION and experimentation and research in the context of nuclear power

US District Court 99 EVELYN HEINRICH ON BEHALF OF HER HUSBAND GEORGE HEINRICH, HENRY M. SIENKEWICZ, JR., ON BEHALF OF HIS MOTHER EILEEN ROSE SIENKEWICZ, ROSEMARY GUALTIERI ON BEHALF OF HER FATHER JOSEPH MAYNE, WALTER CARL VAN DYKE ON BEHALF OF HIS FATHER WALTER CARMEN VAN DYKE AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, PLAINTIFFS, v. WILLIAM H. SWEET, M.D., TRUSTEE OF THE LEE EDWARD FARR TRUST DATED 1/11/71, AS AMENDED, THE ESTATE OF LEE EDWARD FARR, M.D., ASSOCIATED UNIVERSITIES, INC., MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL HOSPITAL, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, DEFENDANTS. CIVIL ACTION NO. 97-12134-WGY UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 62 F. Supp. 2d 282; 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12943 August 16, 1999,

Decided The private defendants, however, argue that two of these tests ought quickly yield a result in their favor. First, although the plaintiffs contend that the private defendants assumed a traditional public function by operating a nuclear reactor, the private defendants argue that the function "traditionally exclusively reserved to the [government]," [id. at 493-94](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T15305885381&homeCsi=6323&A=0.23748907765458016&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=84%20F.3d%20487,%20493&countryCode=USA" \t "_parent)**,** is that of energy production through the operation of nuclear reactors, not experimentation or research. Likewise, the private defendants believe that the "symbiotic relationship" test is not met [\*\*65] because the Plaintiffs have not alleged that the United States shared in any profits obtained from the complained-of activity, nor have they alleged that the United States mandated the allegedly unconstitutional activity (namely, experimentation without obtaining informed consent). See [id. at 494](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T15305885381&homeCsi=6323&A=0.23748907765458016&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=84%20F.3d%20487,%20494&countryCode=USA" \t "_parent). Both of these arguments are misplaced. First, the private defendants' distinction between energy production and experimentation does not control [HN32](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1344749943852&returnToKey=20_T15305920652&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.223937.6839398104" \l "clscc32" \t "_self)the traditional public function test. That test asks whether "the private entity assumed powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State." [Rockwell v. Cape Cod Hosp., 26 F.3d 254, 258 (1st Cir. 1994)](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T15305885381&homeCsi=6323&A=0.23748907765458016&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=26%20F.3d%20254,%20258&countryCode=USA" \t "_parent) (internal quotations omitted). The use and control of radioactive substances presents a highly unusual factual setting. Under federal law, the possession and use of fissionable materials was not just traditionally reserved to the government, but was legally mandated to be reserved to the government. See Atomic Energy Act of 1946 §§ 4, 5 (prescribing that only the Commission could own a nuclear reactor that was capable of producing "within a reasonable period of time a sufficient quantity of fissionable [\*\*66] material to produce an atomic bomb or any other atomicweapon" and only the Commission could own fissionable materials). In the view of Congress, there were sound policy reasons for this exclusivity: one of the purposes of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 was to provide "[a] program for Government control of the production, ownership, and use of fissionable material to assure the common defense and security . . . ." Id. at § 1(b)(4). Although the Act clearly contemplated private research activities under Commission supervision and allowed certain small-scale research facilities to be privately owned, such arrangements were required to "contain such provisions to protect health . . . as the Commission may determine." Id. at §§ 3, 4. If, as the Plaintiffs allege, the Commission failed properly to fulfill its duty of supervision as to the boron neutron capture therapy experiments and indeed knowingly approved of experiments that violated the Commission's own professional guidelines, then it is arguable that the Commission "tried to escape its responsibilities by delegating them to private parties." [Rockwell, 26 F.3d at 258](http://www.lexisnexis.com/lnacui2api/mungo/lexseestat.do?bct=A&risb=21_T15305885381&homeCsi=6323&A=0.23748907765458016&urlEnc=ISO-8859-1&&citeString=26%20F.3d%20254,%20258&countryCode=USA" \t "_parent). In such a situation, the Court views [\*\*67] the exclusive function test as met.

### 2NC A2: For Definition

#### For is a limiting term- has to be exclusive

Clegg, 95 - J.D., 1981 Yale Law School; the author is vice president and general counsel of the National Legal Center for the Public Interest. (Roger, “Reclaiming The Text of The Takings Clause,” 46 S.C. L. Rev. 531, Summer, lexis)

Even if it made no sense to limit the clause to takings "for public use"--and, as discussed below, it might make very good sense--that is the way the clause reads. It is not at all ambiguous. The prepositional phrase simply cannot be read as broadening rather than narrowing the clause's scope. Indeed, a prepositional phrase beginning with "for" appears twice more in the Fifth Amendment, and in both cases there is no doubt that the phrase is narrowing the scope of the Amendment. n20

#### ‘for energy production’ is an adjectival phrase- it must modify the financial incentive

Rozakis 2003 [Laurie E. Rozakis, Ph.D. Excerpted from The Complete Idiot's Guide to Grammar and Style © 2003 “Prepositional Phrases: The Big Daddy of Phrases” http://www.infoplease.com/cig/grammar-style/prepositional-phrases-big-daddy-phrases.html]

When a prepositional phrase serves as an adjective, it's called an adjectival phrase. (That was a no-brainer, eh? Who says you don't get a break in this English biz?)¶ An adjectival phrase, as with an adjective, describes a noun or a pronoun. Here are some examples:¶ The manager with the pink slips terrorized the employees.¶ The adjectival phrase “with the pink slips” describes the noun “manager.”¶ The price of the promotion was much too steep.¶ The adjectival phrase “of the promotion” describes the noun “price.”¶ Something in the corner of the desk was moving.¶ The adjectival phrase “in the corner” describes the noun “something”; the adjectival phrase “of the desk” describes the noun “corner.”

#### Grammar is a prerequisite to clash and creativity

**Leahy, 2005** (Anna Leahy, assistant professor at North Central College and award winning poet, Pedagogy; Vol. 5 Issue 2, p304-308, 5p, “Grammar Matters: A Creative Writer’s Argument” Spring, EBSCO)

Wallace Stegner (2002: 64–65), in On Teaching and Writing Fiction, notes, “Whether dismembered syntax has sprung from ignorance or from the lust after originality, I believe it should be questioned. After all, all a reader knows is the marks on the printed page. Those marks have to contribute meaning.” Like Stegner, I think commas matter, as do sentence structures that convey, support, or make ironic the meanings of the words themselves. Ursula Le Guin (1998: 33), in Steering the Craft, puts it slightly differently: our standards for writing, including for grammar and syntax, must be higher than in conversation, “because when we read, we don’t have the speaker’s voice and expression and intonation to make half-finished sentences and misused words clear. We only have the words. And, to be clear to as many readers as possible, they have to follow the agreed-upon rules, the shared rules, of grammar and usage.” When a student spells one word as another or misses a comma after an unwieldy clause, we can downplay its importance, having seen enough similar slips to surmise a larger idea. If pointed out to the student, she sometimes asserts, “But you know what I meant.” Do I? Does she want to relinquish control of meaning to me? I draw my references here from creative writers because I come to teaching as a creative writer. This position gives me a strange cachet in the grammar business. After all, if a poet supposedly exuding a spontaneous overfl ow of emotion cares about grammar and syntax, it mustn’t be all stifl ing regulations. So, I opt to quote to my students the likes of Tom Robbins and Stephen King instead of Strunk and White, whose work I appreciate more than I expect my students will. Grammar, according to Kim Addonizio and Dorianne Laux (1997: 171), “sounds stern, forbidding, and worst of all dull. It smacks of the elementary school classroom, of the meaningless dissection of sentences, of onerous burdens laid on the helpless shoulders of children. But if you are really interested in writing poetry, grammar can be something else: a door to rooms you might never otherwise discover, a way to realize and articulate your visions in language.” Knowing and talking about grammar, syntax, and style—recollecting in tranquillity, shall we say—is part of immersing oneself in language as a writer and is the student’s responsibility when using language to convey ideas. And I now see it more clearly as part of my responsibility as a teacher. The creative writer’s approach to grammar, syntax, and style allows me to bring import and enthusiasm to this teacherly responsibility, to assert its power and reward in writing. In Skinny Legs and All, novelist Robbins (1991: 172) includes a scene in which his characters discuss a word used sloppily, in this case neat. Can o’ Beans remarks, “Slang possesses an economy, an immediacy that’s attractive, all right, but it devalues experience by standardizing and fuzzing it. It hangs between humanity and the real world like a . . . a veil. Slang just makes people more stupid, that’s all, and stupidity eventually makes them crazy.” Fair or not, vague, confusing, or inaccurate sentences imply that those undesirable sentence qualities apply to the ideas and, in the world beyond the classroom, to the writer. Grammar and syntax indeed might allow people to articulate, as clearly as possible, the world and, perhaps, to see it clearly as well. As Le Guin notes (1998: 32), “Even with the best intentions, language misused, language used stupidly, carelessly, brutally, language used wrongly, breeds lies, half-truths, confusion.” To be lax with grammar and syntax might both reflect and cause confusion or ignorance.

### 2NC A2: EIA Financial Incentives

#### Your evidence says that R&D has the same goal as a financial incentive but is not one

EIA 1 – US Energy Information Administration (Renewable Energy 2000: Issues and Trends, Report prepared by the US Energy Information Administration, "Incentives, Mandates, and Government Programs for Promoting Renewable Energy", http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/renewables/06282000.pdf)

The intended effect of a financial incentive is to increase¶ the production or consumption of the good or service¶ over what it otherwise would have been without the¶ incentive. Examples of financial incentives are: tax¶ credits, production payments, trust funds, and low-cost¶ loans. Research and development is included as a support program because its effect is to decrease cost,¶ thus enhancing the commercial viability of the good(s)¶ provided.¶ 4

### 2NC: A2: Applied R&D

#### This is a distinction without a difference- there is no reason why applied R&D is more ‘for energy production’ than regular R&D

#### Fusion is “basic reaserch” NOT applied – their author

EIA 99 [Energy Information Administration / Federal Energy Market Interventions 1999: Primary Energy, “3. Federal Energy Research and Development”, [http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy/pdf/research.pdf)](http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy/pdf/research.pdf%29)]

Basic Research

Basic Energy Research

General Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,672.8 2,059.3 1,624.2

General Energy Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,004.1 999.4 821.8

Environment, Safety, and Health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585.3 161.6 47.4

Unallocated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47.4 68.8 49.8

Fusion Energy Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 872.5 379.1 222.6

**Total Basic Research Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,182.1 3,668.1 2,765.9**

Applied Research **and Development**

Nuclear Power

New Nuclear Plants (Nuclear Energy Research Initiative) . . . . . . . . . . . . 139.2 221.2 30.0

Waste/Fuel/Safety (Environmental Management) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 707.1 754.6 466.6

Unallocated (Termination Costs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168.6 155.9 143.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,014.9 1,131.7 639.6

Coal

Advanced Clean Efficient Power Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168.3 166.4 87.7

Advanced Clean Fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.8 57.1 15.5

Advanced Research and Technology Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92.8 91.8 19.9

Interagency National Acid Precipitation Assessment Programb . . . . . . . . 35.4 35.4 (c)

Unallocated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90.0 121.1 97.1

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444.3 471.7 220.2

Other Fossil Energy

Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58.6 57.8 48.6

Shale Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 6.7 0.0

Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14.4 14.2 115.2

U.S. Geological Survey Energy Research and Developmentb . . . . . . . . . 29.7 29.7 (c)

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109.2 108.3 163.8

Renewable Energy

Wind, Photovoltaic, and Other Solar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156.3 135.9 133.9

Biofuels and Biomass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24.4 44.5 95.5

Geothermal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31.0 30.7 28.5

Hydroelectric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 1.2 3.3

Electricity Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43.4 42.9 44.1

Unallocated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.6 20.6 22.0

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277.9 275.8 327.2

Electric Utility (Advanced Turbine Systems)d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 5.4 33.0

**Total Applied Research and Development Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . 1,851.7 1,992.9 1,383.8**

Clean Coal Outlays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184.8 151.7 183.0

**Total Applied Research and Development, Including Clean Coal . . . . . . 2,036.5 2,144.6 1,566.8**

## Leadership

#### Realism means that science diplomacy fails- states will still prevent effective solutions

David **Dickson** Director, SciDev.Net 4 June **2009** The limits of science diplomacy http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/the-limits-of-science-diplomacy.html

The truth is that science and politics make an uneasy alliance. Both need the other. Politicians need science to achieve their goals, whether social, economic or — unfortunately — military; scientists need political support to fund their research. But they also occupy different universes. Politics is, at root, about exercising power by one means or another. Science is — or should be — about pursuing robust knowledge that can be put to useful purposes. A strategy for promoting science diplomacy that respects these differences deserves support. Particularly so if it focuses on ways to leverage political and financial backing for science's more humanitarian goals, such as tackling climate change or reducing world poverty. But a commitment to science diplomacy that ignores the differences — acting for example as if science can substitute politics (or perhaps more worryingly, vice versa), is dangerous. The Obama administration's commitment to "soft power" is already faltering. It faces challenges ranging from North Korea's nuclear weapons test to domestic opposition to limits on oil consumption. A taste of reality may be no bad thing.

#### No methods for utilizing fusion as sustainable base-load energy – instability of tritium and neutron loss.

Francois Cellier, 11-10-2009, MS in electrical engineering, PhD degree in technical sciences from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Zurich, worked at the University of Arizona as professor in electrical engineering, specialization in modeling and simulation methodologies, specialist in modeling and simulation of physical systems at the Institute of Computational Science, The Oil Drum: Europe, “The Future of Nuclear Energy: Facts and Fiction - Part IV: Energy from Breeder Reactors and from Fusion?,” <http://www.iseof.org/~europe/node/5929#Ref_31>

It follows from first principles that the sometimes discussed "cold fusion" reaction is in contradiction with well-established knowledge of subatomic physics. As the repulsive force increases with the number of protons involved, the conditions to achieve fusion with atoms heavier than hy­drogen and its isotopes become more and more difficult. It follows that fusion reactions based for example on the "proton-boron" reaction and many others are only possible using accelerators. Ideas to use accelerators for continuous fusion reactions with commercially interesting GW power prove to be wishful thinking once the required amount of 1021 fusion reactions per second is considered. The very low efficiency for transforming electric energy into kinetic energy of proton beams poses another fundamental problem

 for such exotic ideas. The probability of a fusion reaction depends on the product of the plasma temperature and the fusion reaction cross-section. The deuterium-tritium fusion is a factor of 100 to 1000 easier to achieve than the next two fusion reactions of deuterium and He32 and deuterium-deuterium, respectively. As it is already extremely difficult to achieve even the lowest interesting plasma temperatures on the required large scale, it follows that the only possible fusion reaction under reactor conditions is the deuterium-tritium fusion into helium (He42). An additional advantage of this reaction is the fact that the produced additional neutron carries 14 MeV of the liberated energy of almost 18 MeV per fusion reaction out of the plasma zone. Thus in theory, it can be imagined that the 4 MeV carried by the helium nucleus are used to keep the plasma temperature high enough, and that the neutron energy is transferred somehow to another cooling medium. This medium is imagined to transfer the heat to a generator. Unfortunately tritium is unstable; its half-life is only 12.3 years; and it does not exist in sizable amounts on our planet. It must therefore be produced in a breeding process. In comparison to the breeding and energy extraction in fission reactions, at least three additional fundamental problems can be identified for the fusion process: A sustained super high temperature, at least 10 million degrees, is required in order to have fusion reactions happening at an interesting rate. Such high temperatures can be achieved in some special magnetic field arrangements or in a tiny volume with very intense laser or particle beams. Unfortunately, no material is known that can survive the intense neutron flux under sustained reactor conditions and the sometimes occurring plasma eruptions. It is difficult to transfer the energy from the 14 MeV neutron to a gas or a liquid without neutron losses. The considered breeding reaction requires essentially that 100% of the produced neutrons must be used to make tritium. As this is even theoretically impossible, some additional nuclear reactions are proposed where heavier nucleons act as neutron multipliers. However so far, even the most optimistic and idealized theoretical calculations have failed to produce neutrons in sufficient numbers. In short, the accumulated knowledge today indicates that the proposed fusion reaction is unsus­tainable and cannot lead to a sustainable power production.

## STEM

### 2NC Impact Calc

#### Outweighs on magnitude

Ira Helfand and John Pastore (both past presidents of Physicians for Social Responsibility) March 31, 2009, “U.S.-Russia nuclear war still a threat”, http://www.projo.com/opinion/contributors/content/CT\_pastoreline\_03-31-09\_EODSCAO\_v15.bbdf23.html

President Obama and Russian President Dimitri Medvedev are scheduled to Wednesday in London during the G-20 summit. They must not let the current economic crisis keep them from focusing on one of the greatest threats confronting humanity: the danger of nuclear war. Since the end of the Cold War, many have acted as though the danger of nuclear war has ended. It has not. There remain in the world more than 20,000 nuclear weapons. Alarmingly, more than 2,000 of these weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals remain on ready-alert status, commonly known as hair-trigger alert. They can be fired within five minutes and reach targets in the other country 30 minutes later. Just one of these weapons can destroy a city. A war involving a substantial number would cause devastation on a scale unprecedented in human history. A study conducted by Physicians for Social Responsibility in 2002 showed that if only 500 of the Russian weapons on high alert exploded over our cities, 100 million Americans would die in the first 30 minutes. An attack of this magnitude also would destroy the entire economic, communications and transportation infrastructure on which we all depend. Those who survived the initial attack would inhabit a nightmare landscape with huge swaths of the country blanketed with radioactive fallout and epidemic diseases rampant. They would have no food, no fuel, no electricity, no medicine, and certainly no organized health care. In the following months it is likely the vast majority of the U.S. population would die. Recent studies by the eminent climatologists Toon and Robock have shown that such a war would have a huge and immediate impact on climate world wide. If all of the warheads in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals were drawn into the conflict, the firestorms they caused would loft 180 million tons of soot and debris into the upper atmosphere — blotting out the sun. Temperatures across the globe would fall an average of 18 degrees Fahrenheit to levels not seen on earth since the depth of the last ice age, 18,000 years ago. Agriculture would stop, eco-systems would collapse, and many species, including perhaps our own, would become extinct. It is common to discuss nuclear war as a low-probabillity event. But is this true? We know of five occcasions during the last 30 years when either the U.S. or Russia believed it was under attack and prepared a counter-attack. The most recent of these near misses occurred after the end of the Cold War on Jan. 25, 1995, when the Russians mistook a U.S. weather rocket launched from Norway for a possible attack. Jan. 25, 1995, was an ordinary day with no major crisis involving the U.S. and Russia. But, unknown to almost every inhabitant on the planet, a misunderstanding led to the potential for a nuclear war. The ready alert status of nuclear weapons that existed in 1995 remains in place today.

#### Highest probability of escalation- no such thing as de-escalation

Michael Krepon Co-founder of the Henry L. Stimson Center Disarmament Diplomacy Issue No. 75, January/February 2004 “From Arms Control to Cooperative Threat Reduction” <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd75/75mk.htm>

The second test, as noted above, is escalation control. If the nuclear threshold were crossed, escalation control would be predicated on shared cost/benefit calculations with an adversary to whom one was meting out mortal damage. Mutual abilities to calibrate and control such calculations amid the radiological ruin of a nuclear war would also be needed. The fragility of these assumptions does not require explanation. As a consequence, the cold logic of nuclear warfighting had every prospect of breaking down should multiple mushroom clouds begin to form. Escalation control, in other words, loses meaning the deeper one side or the other enters the domain of its nuclear warfighting plans.

#### Any risk of retaliation after a counterforce strike is a reason to vote neg- it’s the survival of our civililzation others will hit cities

Valery Yarynich a Candidate of Military Sci., Professor of the Academy for Military Sciences. He holds the position of Visiting Associate Professor of California State University San Bernardino and Steven Starr Senior Scientist Physicians for Social Responsibility Global Research, March 4, 2007 ““Nuclear Primacy" is a Fallacy” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=4991

They write, “some probability of nuclear retaliation far below 100 percent should deter almost any prospective attacker. They [critics] err, however, by assuming that any level of first-strike uncertainty will create a powerful deterrent effect. There is no deductive reason to believe that a country with a 95 percent chance of successfully destroying its enemy's nuclear force on the ground will act as cautiously as a country that only has a 10 percent chance of success.” In our view, this is the main error of Lieber and Press. The decisive factor is the EXISTENCE ITSELF of unacceptable results of retaliation, independent of their probability and size. This is because the individual probability of unacceptable results among all possible results of modeling does not play the decisive role; ANY of the calculated results IS possible if a real nuclear war occurs; i.e., IS, but not ARE, because a real nuclear war is possible only one time. In 1987, American experts stated that, “Dramatically different outcomes might not be downright unlikely, but only less than the expected outcome. The expected outcome, thought the most likely, might nonetheless be unlikely . . . most sinister of all, but almost surely present, are the ‘unknown unknowns' of which operational planners are not even aware.” (Managing Nuclear Operations, by A.Carter, J.Steinbruner and C.Zraket, 1987, p.612)

#### Turns the case- prevents leadership

Charles L. Glaser is Professor and Deputy Dean of the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago. Steve Fetter is Professor and Dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84–126

We have found at most a very limited set of scenarios in which nuclear counterforce missions might increase U.S. security. Nuclear counterforce would provide the promised beneªts—for deterrence, damage limitation, and U.S. foreign policy—in only a tiny fraction of potential conºict scenarios because the United States has a highly effective deterrent without these missions; because most types of counterforce targets can be destroyed by U.S. conventional weapons; and because nuclear weapons cannot destroy some critical targets. In addition, these missions could bring a variety of costs. Relying on nuclear counterforce capabilities to restore leeway to U.S. foreign policy is risky because a United States that bargains harder because it has a damagelimitation capability could also be more likely to be attacked with nuclear weapons by a determined adversary. In addition, a doctrine that emphasizes nuclear counterforce options could increase the probability that the United States would unnecessarily escalate a conventional conºict—preempting when in fact the adversary was not going to attack—and heighten the probability that an adversary would accidentally use nuclear weapons during a crisis. Moreover, pursuing additional nuclear counterforce capabilities would hurt the U.S. ability to maintain and strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Actually using nuclear weapons would bring additional costs, shattering the nuclear taboo and damaging the United States’ international reputation. These costs lead us to conclude that the United States should not rely on nuclear counterforce to reduce the constraining effects of nuclear proliferation on its foreign policy.

### A2: Deterrence

#### Min deterrence is sufficient

Hans M.**Kristensen,** director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. Robert S.**Norris,** senior research associate with the Natural Resources Defense Council nuclear program and director of the Nuclear Weapons Databook project. Ivan **Oelrich** vice president for Strategic Security Programs at the Federation of American Scientists. April **09** From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/doctrine/targeting.pdf>, Accessed 6/22/09, ZS)

The essence of deterring an action is to threaten punishment sufficient to make that action appear undesirable. In this case, the action in question is the use of nuclear weapons, particularly against the United States or its allies. The extent of the threatened punishment depends on the context and what is being contested. This minimal deterrence mission is not to deter, for example, a conventional attack by an enemy. Such an attack by itself should be deterred by conventional forces. Yet NATO’s nuclear policy says that the role of its nuclear weapons is “to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war,” 21 a meaningless bluff that has been called against nuclear powers many times: China’s entry into the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Falkland War, the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Iraq’s Scud attacks against Israel, or even the conflict in Northern Ireland. During a conventional war, an enemy may be tempted to introduce nuclear weapons into the conflict because he believes it will give him some advantage. It is only this incremental advantage that U.S. use of nuclear weapons must offset.

### A2: We Just Make the Arsenal Work/ New Doctrines Solve

#### Strengthening the arsenal creates negative threat perceptions- changes in doctrine are not enough to reassure enemies- even if the aff doesn’t result in primacy it does trigger threat perceptions

Keir A. **Lieber**, the author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics Over Technology, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. **Press**, the author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania China Security, Winter **2007**, pp.66 - 89 2007 World Security Institute http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=189

Finally, the importance of the shift in the nuclear balance does not hinge on the U.S. willingness to launch a nuclear attack on Russia or China, let alone on an assumption that a nuclear strike against one of those countries is guaranteed to succeed. Chinese and Russian military planners pay close attention to changes in the U.S. arsenal and are likely to adjust their force levels, deployment patterns, and alert status accordingly. Just as American planners put greater stock in actual Chinese military capabilities than in China’s stated intentions, we assume that Chinese and Russian leaders pay more attention to changes in American military capabilities rather than the declarations from Washington about America’s goals and intentions. Therefore, even if the United States would never launch a preemptive nuclear strike, the pursuit of nuclear primacy should be expected to trigger a response among U.S. adversaries.

### 2NC Alert Mod

#### Elimination of counterforce leads to lower alert levels from Russia and China

Hans M.**Kristensen,** director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists. Robert S. **Norris,** senior research associate with the Natural Resources Defense Council nuclear program and director of the Nuclear Weapons Databook project. Ivan **Oelrich** vice president for Strategic Security Programs at the Federation of American Scientists. April **09** From Counterforce to Minimal Deterrence: A New Nuclear Policy on the Path Toward Eliminating Nuclear Weapons, <http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/doctrine/targeting.pdf>, Accessed 6/22/09, ZS)

If the United States abandons its counterforce capability under a minimal deterrence policy, changes in Russian and Chinese arsenal size and deployment could result. The Russians could make some immediate changes in response. For example, since they are as worried about responding disastrously to a false warning of attack as the United States is, they could adjust their threshold for launch to reflect their altered perception of the threat. China, likewise, might, if the United States and Russia relaxed their postures, be less inclined to modify its nuclear doctrine, a concern stated repeatedly by the Pentagon.

**Makes escalation inevitable**

Sagan 1990 (Scott Sagan, professor of political science and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, 1990 “Nuclear Alerts and Crisis Management” in “Nuclear diplomacy and crisis management: an International security reader” p. 191-3)

A “NO-ALERTS” POLICY? It would be equally in error, however, to believe that because the nuclear alerts and accompanying conventional force operations taken in past crises were difficult to control, they must never be used again under any circumstances. Any suggestion for a “no-alerts” policy would ignore the fact that the purposes that nuclear alerts were meant to serve in the past are likely to remain important in future crises and are unlikely to be met, in all scenarios, other means. Any decision to place nuclear forces on alert in the future will be an extremely dangerous step, but it is by no means clear that the inherent risks involved with an alert will always be greater than the dangers produced by refraining from alerting forces. Even if the United States could threaten a devastating retaliatory response without generating its forces, the failure to alert nuclear forces in a severe crisis, especially one in which Soviet strategic forces were moving to a higher state of readiness, might tempt the leadership in Moscow to continue escalating the crisis in the belief that the United States was willing to back down.89 difficult judgments would have to be made, weighing the risks of alerting versus not alerting strategic forces, in numerous unlikely but possible scenarios: if the Soviets threaten to attack NATO’s Central Front in the chaotic situation produced by a disintegration of the Eastern European bloc; if the Soviets threatened a nuclear strike against China; if an invasion of Saudi Arabia appeared imminent; or if there was a replay of the Cuban missile crisis with the Soviets placing missiles in Nicaragua or Cuba. In each of these cases, the risks of escalation and war are present whether or not nuclear forces are put on alert. The 1973 case illustrates the point. Putting forces on alert was not a risk-free option; neither, however, was allowing the Soviets to put forces into Egypt. Not only would such an action have set erous precedent for future crises, but Soviet intervention might have led to direct combat with the Israelis, increasing the risk of American involve- ment. Indeed, the risk of escalation was inherent in the situation. The alert certainly highlighted this fact, but it did not create it. In short, wisdom begins in this area with an awareness that one can err either on the side of being excess cautious or excessively provocative. The following observations on what can go wrong when nuclear and con- ventional forces are put on a higher state of readiness in a crisis do not, therefore, mean that such steps must never be taken in the future. They do suggest, however, that if military alerts are deemed necessary in a crisis, it will be essential that they be controlled with the utmost prudence and discipline. What can go Wrong? Much of the recent public concern about nuclear war has focused on the frightening “Dr. Strangelove” scenario: the danger of an unauthorized use of nuclear weapons Of nuclear weapons by a military commander leading to nuclear war. In normal peacetime circumstances, however, the numerous mechanical devices and organizational “checks and balances” that have been developed to prevent unauthorized use of weaponry make this path of accidental nuclear war highly unlikely. In a severe crisis, with nuclear forces placed on extremely high levels of alert, some of these restriction are lifted, however, in order to reduce the probability of a Soviet first-strike successfully “decapitating” the American arsenal. For other obvious reasons, the precise details of the process by which the devolution of command authrotiy takes place and the extent of predelegation of authority to use nuclear weapons, if any in fact exists, are kept highly classified. Although layers of secrecy surround this issue, it is unlikely that predelegation extends to the first-use of offensive strategic nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union under any circumstances. Still, any predelegation authority to launch nuclear forces in retaliation after a Soviet attack upon the United States would produce serious problems with respect to controlling or terminating a nuclear exchange once begun and at least would raise the possibility of accidental war occurring through a warning or assessment failure during a superpower crisis. It would be a mistake, however, to focus exclusively on the danger of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. As the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated, a variety of incidents can occur during a crisis which are neither purely accidental nor unauthorized, but which nonetheless raise the danger of inadvertent escalation. In many of the cases, actions that may have been judged inappropriate by higher political or military authorities were taken by local military commanders who have both good military reasons for taking the action and ample discretionary authority to do so. Such incidents are likely to be a permanent danger in severe crises. Crises are unique and unpredictable. Military rules of engagement and delegations of authority must be preplanned, however, and in crises there is often insufficient time to review such procedures and tailor them to the specific confrontation at hand. These resulting dangers are further compounded when conventional and nuclear forces are placed at higher conditions of alert because rules of engagement and delegations of authority can change in ways that may be inadequately understood by central authorities. In addition, there is a danger that a movement toward a mutual high level alert in a serious crisis could put central authorities under severe pressure to take conventional escalatory steps that they would otherwise prefer to avoid. For example, in a severe crisis, in which both superpowers have alerted their nuclear forces to unprecedented levels, the national command authorities might feel extreme pressure to relieve the strategic arsenal from the danger of quick strike decapitation. One possible conventional option would be to attack the enemy’s most threatening forces such as submarines patrolling off one’s coasts. Moreover, in any convetional war between the Soviet Union and the United States, during which nuclear forces would be at an extremely high state of alert, American leaders could authorize what it viewed as conventional attacks against Soviet conventional forces, which mostcow might view as attacks against its strategic forces. For example, an American ASW campaign against Soviet attack submarines in “forward areas” might bee seen in Moscow, correctly or incorrectly, as an attack on Soveit strategic submarines. Any one of these authorized escalatory steps might lead to uncontrolled escalation.

# 1NR

### K

#### The role of the ballot is to endorse best scholarship- We are intellectuals not policymakers- this means you should think more about the academic content than the political ramifications-Now is the key time to question exceptionalism- we have to make a decision about our future course

Edwards 2012 [Jason A. is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts.¶ Rhetoric & Public Affairs¶ Volume 15, Number 2, Summer 2012 “An Exceptional Debate:¶ The Championing of and Challenge to American Exceptionalism” Project Muse]

The hullabaloo over Obama’s rhetoric is symptomatic of a larger debate in the United States concerning its exceptionalist ethos, which is fundamental to questions concerning who we are as Americans, where we are going, and how we relate to the world around us.7 American exceptionalism is the belief that the United States is unique among, if not superior to, other nation-states. It is the fundamental agent that has underwritten arguments concerning America’s destiny.8 Currently, our exceptionalist ethos is in flux, partly because of the drumbeat of American decline that has become a constant refrain in American politics. Accordingly, the nature of American exceptionalism and how we enact that exceptionalism is under debate. A number of recent works have spoken to how American exceptionalism has manifested itself in U.S. history, how it can be restored, and how it endangers the United States. Read together, these works demonstrate the power and seduction that American exceptionalism still holds in U.S. politics and culture. My [End Page 352] aim in this review essay is to outline the contours of the debate concerning American exceptionalism, while providing insight into its specific flashpoints, champions, and challengers. Ultimately, the books reviewed here point to present and future self-reflection Americans must have about who they are and how they interact with the outside world.

#### Prerequisite to policy- Discourses of energy policy determine the solutions that we attempt

Laura Nader University of California, Berkeley Anthropological Quarterly 77.4 (2004) 771-791 “The Harder Path—Shifting Gears” Project Muse

I came to realize that energy discourses were often one of "no option." The inevitablity syndrome I called it. Whatever path was being proposed was a "have to path." For example, "we have to push nuclear because there are no alternatives." Such a coercive frame was limiting to say the least, especially [End Page 775] since other options were what was being examined. Method was also part of the problem. For example, growth models—that took for granted increasing per capita energy consumption—were disabling when economists (even Nobel economists) were examining less is more options. Also striking was the omnipresent model of unilinear development (a concept that anthropologists had left in the dust decades earlier), with little general understanding of macro-processes. For example, the recognition that civilizations arise but that they also collapse was missing from the thinking about the present. Prevalent was the nineteenth century belief that technological progress was equivalent to social progress. In such a progressivist evolutionary frame science too could only rise and not fall or wane. Furthermore, the possibility that experts might be part of the problem was novel to the expert who thought that he stood outside of the problem. The idea that the energy problem had human dimensions, that it was a human problem, slowly began to sink in, although such realization was rarely attributed to social science sources. Many of my commentaries were adamantly opposed in those years, to put it mildly. Colleagues rejected the idea that the science bureaucracies had a limiting effect on definitions and solutions, and also a framing effect on cultural outlook. This view was adamantly opposed by directors at Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and by those who believe that science is autonomous and culture free.

#### These arguments all implicate the nature of a permutation- if we win our method first offense the perms become incoherent

### 2NC Perm

#### Americans have a tendency to overestimate our benefits to the world- prevents effective policy

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Bottom line: Americans take too much credit for global progress and accept too little blame for areas where U.S. policy has in fact been counterproductive. Americans are blind to their weak spots, and in ways that have real-world consequences. Remember when Pentagon planners thought U.S. troops would be greeted in Baghdad with flowers and parades? They mostly got RPGs and IEDs instead.

#### Exceptional discourse pervades and interferes in every American discourse

Edwards 2012 [Jason A. is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at Bridgewater State University in Massachusetts.¶ Rhetoric & Public Affairs¶ Volume 15, Number 2, Summer 2012 “An Exceptional Debate:¶ The Championing of and Challenge to American Exceptionalism” Project Muse]

I begin this review essay with Sylvia Söderlind and James Taylor Carson’s edited collection American Exceptionalisms, which chronicles how exceptionalism has manifested itself throughout U.S. history. These essays, according to the introduction, illustrate “both the history and the pervasiveness of the assumptions underlying the political debate about the role of the United States in the world. Our premise is that exceptionalism . . . inflects every discourse involving relations between the United States and its—internal as well as external—others and that even dissenting counterdiscourses rely on the commonality of assumptions underlying the national ethos” (9). Through 11 chapters and an afterword, Söderlind and Carson have gathered together a group of scholars who have a common desire to “understand how and why the rhetoric of exceptionalism has shaped, and continues to shape, the writing of history and culture in the United States” (9). I highlight four representative chapters.

### 2NC Impact Overview

#### Exceptionalism is the best explanation for conflict

Edward Rhodes Dean of George Mason University’s School of Public Policy Security Studies Volume 21, Issue 2, 2012 “Why Nations Fight: Spirit, Identity, and Imagined Community” Taylor and Francis

To use Lebow's terminology, a civic construction of identity has interesting implications for how spirit is manifested. Because they place the state at the center of identity, civic constructions of the nation create pressure for the glorification of one's state and an insistence that one's state (not one's biology, religion, language, or culture) is better than that of the other. Manifestations or embodiments of the state take on symbolic importance even in the absence of “real” significance: being the first state to travel into space or to reach the moon, or the state with the greatest number (or largest size) of nuclear missiles takes on a significance that would be otherwise inexplicable. After all, if membership in a national group is defined by allegiance to a particular state (and if individuals are potentially free to choose to give allegiance to another state), the greatness of our state becomes essential to our view of ourselves and our willingness to contribute to and to continue to belong to this imagined community. In terms of “threat,” anything that challenges the state and its sovereignty directly endangers the nation's very existence—something that is not true if the nation is constructed in other ways. (In other constructions of national identity, the state may be extremely useful, but it is not essential for the nation's existence. Consider, for example, the experience of the Polish, Kurdish, and Palestinian nations.) This has interesting implications for the potential for tolerating super-sovereign authorities, and may help to explain the paranoia of some Americans regarding the League of Nations and the United Nations. Interestingly, by drawing our attention to the importance of spirit, Lebow's analysis helps us to understand why “civic” nations are so enormously sensitive to insults to symbols of the state—why burning an American flag, for example, provokes paroxysms of national outrage. So, why do nations fight? A constructivist extension of Lebow's analysis suggests that it depends on the markers that nations use to define themselves, and thus on what engages their spirit. Lebow insightfully draws our attention to the fact that in our social scientific drive for parsimonious explanation we would be ill-advised to reduce our accounts of human motivation simply to fear and interest. As he notes, war plays an evolving role not only in addressing fear and interest but in satisfying other human emotions and needs as well, perhaps most importantly in addressing expressions of spirit. But a constructivist would add that spirit, like interest and security, is socially constructed: “self-esteem” and “honor” are defined in social context and through social interaction. In the abstract, they cannot meaningfully be used to explain or predict real-word behavior. It is only as they are constructed in actual practice—that is, only as political communities come to construct their identities—that these manifestations of spirit take on content. It is in the interaction between spirit and the various ways humans define and create the borders of national communities that we can find explanations for the patterns of violent conflict that we see in today's world, and are likely to see in tomorrow's.

### A2: Other Countries are Worse

#### Historically we are as bad- no room for moral judgement

Walt 2011[Stephen M. Walt, an FP contributing editor, is Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government NOVEMBER 2011, Foreign Policy, “The Myth of American Exceptionalism” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism]

Declarations of American exceptionalism rest on the belief that the United States is a uniquely virtuous nation, one that loves peace, nurtures liberty, respects human rights, and embraces the rule of law. Americans like to think their country behaves much better than other states do, and certainly better than other great powers.¶ If only it were true. The United States may not have been as brutal as the worst states in world history, but a dispassionate look at the historical record belies most claims about America's moral superiority.¶ For starters, the United States has been one of the most expansionist powers in modern history. It began as 13 small colonies clinging to the Eastern Seaboard, but eventually expanded across North America, seizing Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California from Mexico in 1846. Along the way, it eliminated most of the native population and confined the survivors to impoverished reservations. By the mid-19th century, it had pushed Britain out of the Pacific Northwest and consolidated its hegemony over the Western Hemisphere.¶ The United States has fought numerous wars since then -- starting several of them -- and its wartime conduct has hardly been a model of restraint. The 1899-1902 conquest of the Philippines killed some 200,000 to 400,000 Filipinos, most of them civilians, and the United States and its allies did not hesitate to dispatch some 305,000 German and 330,000 Japanese civilians through aerial bombing during World War II, mostly through deliberate campaigns against enemy cities. No wonder Gen. Curtis LeMay, who directed the bombing campaign against Japan, told an aide, "If the U.S. lost the war, we would be prosecuted as war criminals." The United States dropped more than 6 million tons of bombs during the Indochina war, including tons of napalm and lethal defoliants like Agent Orange, and it is directly responsible for the deaths of many of the roughly 1 million civilians who died in that war.¶ More recently, the U.S.-backed Contra war in Nicaragua killed some 30,000 Nicaraguans, a percentage of their population equivalent to 2 million dead Americans. U.S. military action has led directly or indirectly to the deaths of 250,000 Muslims over the past three decades (and that's a low-end estimate, not counting the deaths resulting from the sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s), including the more than 100,000 people who died following the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. U.S. drones and Special Forces are going after suspected terrorists in at least five countries at present and have killed an unknown number of innocent civilians in the process. Some of these actions may have been necessary to make Americans more prosperous and secure. But while Americans would undoubtedly regard such acts as indefensible if some foreign country were doing them to us, hardly any U.S. politicians have questioned these policies. Instead, Americans still wonder, "Why do they hate us?"¶ The United States talks a good game on human rights and international law, but it has refused to sign most human rights treaties, is not a party to the International Criminal Court, and has been all too willing to cozy up to dictators -- remember our friend Hosni Mubarak? -- with abysmal human rights records. If that were not enough, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the George W. Bush administration's reliance on waterboarding, extraordinary rendition, and preventive detention should shake America's belief that it consistently acts in a morally superior fashion. Obama's decision to retain many of these policies suggests they were not a temporary aberration.¶ The United States never conquered a vast overseas empire or caused millions to die through tyrannical blunders like China's Great Leap Forward or Stalin's forced collectivization. And given the vast power at its disposal for much of the past century, Washington could certainly have done much worse. But the record is clear: U.S. leaders have done what they thought they had to do when confronted by external dangers, and they paid scant attention to moral principles along the way. The idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous may be comforting to Americans; too bad it's not true.

### A2 Impact Turns

#### American exceptionalism attempts to rid the earth of danger. Only the plan causes global escalatory violence- we come to believe in our own omnipotence

Robert Jay Lifton (Visiting professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School) 2003 “Superpower Syndrome” p. 125-30

It is almost un-American to be vulnerable. As a people, we pride ourselves on being able to stand up to anything, solve all problems. We have long had a national self-image that involves the ability to call forth reservoirs of strength when we need it, and a sense of a protected existence particular to America in an otherwise precarious world. In recent times we managed, after all, to weather the most brutal century in human history relatively unscathed. The Blessed Country. Our attitude stems partly from geography. We have always claimed a glorious aloneness thanks to what has been called the “free security” of the two great oceans which separate us from dangerous upheavals in Europe and Asia. While George Washington was not the isolationist he is sometimes represented to be, he insisted in his celebrated Farewell Address of 1796, "'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world. "That image has been embraced, and often simplified or distorted, by politicians ever since. (He warned against permanent alliances, not alliances in general.) The idea of our separateness and safety from faraway conflicts has had importance from the time of the early settlers, many of whom left Europe to escape political religious, or legal threats or entanglements. Even if on came as an adventurer or an empire-builder, one was leaving a continent of complexity and conflict for a land whose remoteness could support new beginnings Abraham Lincoln absolutized that remoteness and security from outside attack in order to stress that our only danger came from ourselves: "All the armies of Euro •Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth (our own excepted) in their military chest; with Buonaparte for a commander, could not by force, take drink from the Ohio, or make a track on the Blue Ridge in a trial of a thousand years." However much the world has shrunk technologically in the last half century, and however far-ranging our own superpower forays, the sense of geographic invulnerability has never left us. We have seen ourselves as not only separate from but different from the rest of the world, a special nation among nations. That sense of American exceptionalism was intensely observed by Alexis de Tocqueville, the brilliant French politician and writer, in the early nineteenth century. In de Tocqueville’s view of America, “A course almost without limits, a field without horizon, is revealed: the human spirit rushes forward and traverses [it] in every direction.” American excecptionalism has always been, as the sociologist Seymo0ur Martin Lipset has pointed out, “a double-edged sword.” In the psychological life of Americans it has been bound up with feelings of unique virtue, strength, and success. But this has sometime led Americans to be “utopian moralists, who press hard to institutionalize virtue, to destroy evil people, and eliminate wicked institutions and practices.” That subjective exceptoinalism has been vividly expressed in the historian Richard Hofstadter’s observation “it has been our fate as a nation not to have ideologies, but to be one.” At the time of the Puritans, sentiments of exceptionalism were expressed in biblical terms: America was an “arcadian image of the New World…an Eden from which the serpent and forbidden trees had been thoroughly excluded,” and “a new Promised Land and a New Jerusalem.” The language was that of a postapocalyptic utopia, and remnants of such sentiments persist whenever we speak of ourselves in more secular terms as the “new world.” Important to this feeling of exceptionalism has been a deep sense that America offered unparalleled access to regenerative power. As Richard Slotkin explains: “The first colonists saw in America an opportunity to regenerate their fortunes, their spirits, and the power of their church and nation," though "the means to that regeneration ultimately became the means of violence." Even when Americans played what has been called a "shell game of identity," they could experience an unlimited capacity for renewal—endless new beginnings as individuals or as a nation. Slotkin speaks of a new relationship to authority in the new world. While "in Europe all men were under authority; in America all men dreamed they had the power to become authority." These claims of new authority extended to the country as a whole, to America's authority among nations—a claim to new national authority that was expanded over time thanks to America's considerable achievements—economic, technological, scientific, and cultural. American exceptionalism has often had the overall psychological quality of a sense of ourselves as a blessed people immune from the defeats and sufferings of others. But underneath that sense there had to be a potential chink 'our psychological armor—which was a deep-seated hidden sense of vulnerability. OMNIPOTENCE AND VULNERABILITY Ironically, superpower syndrome projects the problem American vulnerability onto the world stage. A superpower is perceived as possessing more than natural power (In this sense it comes closer to resembling the comic-strip hero Superman than the Nietzschean Superman.)For a nation, its leaders, or even its ordinary citizens to enter into the superpower syndrome is to lay claim to omnipotence, to power that is unlimited, which is ultimately power over death. At the heart of the superpower syndrome then is the need to eliminate a vulnerability that, as the antithesis of omnipotence, contains the basic contradiction of the syndrome. For vulnerability can never be eliminated, either by a nation or an individual. In seeking its elimination, the superpower finds itself on a psychological treadmill. The idea of vulnerability is intolerable, the fact of it irrefutable. One solution is to maintain an illusion of invulnerability. But the superpower then runs the danger of taking increasingly draconian actions to sustain that illusion. For to do otherwise would be to surrender the cherished status of superpower. Other nations have experiences in the world that render them and their citizens all too aware of the essential vulnerability of life on earth. They also may be influenced by religious and cultural traditions (far weaker in the United States) that emphasize vulnerability as an aspect of human mortality. No such reality can be accepted by those clinging to a sense of omnipotence. At issue is the experience of death anxiety, which is the strongest manifestation of vulnerability. Such a deep- seated sense of vulnerability can sometimes be acknowledged by the ordinary citizens of a superpower, or even at times by its leaders, who may admit, for instance, that there is no guaranteed defense against terrorist acts. But those leaders nonetheless remain committed to eliminating precisely that vulnerability—committed, that is, to the illusory goal of invulnerability. When that goal is repeatedly undermined—whether by large-scale terrorist acts like 9/11, or as at present by militant resistance to American hegemony in Iraq and elsewhere in the Midd1-East—both the superpower and the world it acts upon may become dangerously destabilized.

#### American exceptional logic is historically wrong

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Although Mr. Gingrich might be a champion of American exceptionalism, quite a few authors have challenged those ideas and how they are operationalized. Geoffrey Hodgson is one such critic. Hodgson’s Myth of American Exceptionalism questions the very nature of exceptionalism. Mr. Hodgson is a British national who has been “thinking about the United States, reading about the United States, and experiencing American history all my life” (ix). He considers himself to be a friend of America and until the late 1990s, “remained an ‘American’ in my politics” (xii). However, Hodgson maintains that something has been fundamentally wrong with U.S. politics over the past thirty years. What troubles Hodgson most has been the propensity to “a new insistence that America be admired, almost worshipped” (xii). In the last thirty years, U.S. political culture seemed to develop a disdain for journalists and commentators who pointed out the shortcomings of American society and its leaders. As Hodgson reflected on this change, he came to the conclusion that American history had been distorted. The uniqueness of the U.S. political tradition has been overstressed. America’s greatness is not truly her own, because she owes a good chunk of it to Europe, a point which often is ignored. With that in mind, Hodgson spends the next six chapters discussing how the United States is not as exceptional as it believes itself to be.¶ In chapter 1, Hodgson examines the historical development of American exceptionalism, while at the same time challenging the uniqueness of the American experience. Throughout this chapter, Hodgson demonstrates that the rise and expansion of the United States was not wholly of its own making, but relied upon the help and influence from European states and peoples. For example, many trace the origins of American exceptionalism to Puritans who immigrated to the United States seeking religious and political freedom. Yet Puritans like John Winthrop and William Bradford were not Americans, but Europeans. And Hodgson notes they were not unique in their search for political and religious freedom. All over Europe, people struggled to extend the freedom of others. Accordingly, any exceptional ethos derived from the Puritans is at least partly European in nature, and not solely American. Ultimately, Hodgson insists that the “United States did not emerge like Athena from the brow of Zeus, or by a kind of geopolitical virgin birth” (20).¶ Chapters 2–4 continue this motif of debunking the American exceptionalist mythology. In chapter 2, Hodgson examines American history until the [End Page 357] Civil War. He demonstrates how many items that make the United States exceptional—the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, the wide availability of education, territorial expansions westward—were directly linked to experiences in Europe. Chapter 3 investigates the development of America’s exceptionalist ethos from the Civil War to the Cold War. As in chapter 2, Hodgson demystifies some of the myths about the American experience. For example, the reform movements of emancipation and labor and the expansion of rights such as woman suffrage that the United States celebrates as providing a beacon for the world to emulate, had already taken place or were taking place in Europe. Consequently, America’s political development is not as unique as some would believe. Chapter 4 explores the time period comprising the height of the liberal consensus of the 1960s to the ascendancy of conservatism in the 1990s and 2000s. Hodgson describes how items that made the United States exceptional before, such as a reliance on its own natural resources, have led it to undercut its own claims to exceptionalism. The expanding militarism of the United States has repudiated a tradition of being suspicious of standing armies and has led the United States to intervene in the affairs of other nations. This militarism caused fits for American politicians, policymakers, and pundits. America, which once declared its opposition to colonialism, is now a modern empire.